

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

April 11, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB.*

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on Ethiopia and  
Horn of Africa

I transmit herewith the decision minutes of the PRC meeting held today on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. If approved by you, they will be disseminated to the participants for appropriate action.

APPROVE ✓ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENT *Sounds too easy on Ethiopia. Why just "wait & see"? Need thorough discussion [redacted] re Horn.*

(b)(1)

*J*

Partially Declassified/Released on 12-19-90  
under provisions of E.O. 12958 (F13-136)  
by N. Monan, National Security Council

Declassify on: OADR

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POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING

April 11, 1977

Time and Place: 4:00-5:25 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Ethiopia and Horn of Africa

Participants:

The Vice President

State

Secretary Vance  
William Schaufele

Defense


Secretary Brown  
William Duncan  
Leslie Janka

JCS

General George S. Brown  
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

CIA

Admiral Turner

 (b)(3)  
Office of the US Rep. to the UN  
Ambassador Young  
Dr. Anne Holloway

NSC

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
Paul Henze  
Thomas Thornton

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Purpose of the Meeting

The meeting was called, with Secretary Vance in the chair, to review PRM/NSC-21. Under discussion were U.S. arms supply policy toward Ethiopia and, in light of the deteriorating situation in that country, actions to strengthen the U.S. position in Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti and the Sudan.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Current Situation: The meeting reviewed current intelligence on the area which indicates that the military regime in Ethiopia is becoming more brutal and more beleaguered. Ethiopian forces are losing ground steadily to the Eritreans in the north and in the northwest of an exile movement called the Ethiopian Democratic Union. Both elements enjoy Sudanese support. The intelligence community continues to estimate that the military regime can maintain itself in Addis Ababa for an indefinite period of time, but an assassination or coup is always possible. There is some disagreement as to what kind of a government would follow the overthrow of the present military regime.

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Where do we go in Ethiopia? It was agreed that we should not pull out of Ethiopia entirely, because we wish to be in a position to reassert ourselves there if a friendlier and more humane government comes to power. But it was also agreed that we cannot justify further significant support to the present government in view of its moves toward the Soviets, its ineffectiveness in governing its own country and its brutalization of its people. Non-lethal military aid that is in the current pipeline--5T and 2-1/2T trucks and jeeps--will be delivered and military training of Ethiopians in the United States will be continued. All other military aid--ammunition, APCs, F-5 aircraft--even when it has been on order and paid for by the Ethiopians--will be subject to delaying action. We will not tell the Ethiopians we are delaying; we will simply wait and see. Meanwhile, economic aid will continue. This situation will naturally need to be reassessed every few weeks in the light of new developments in Ethiopia.

Somalia: Our Ambassador in Mogadiscio, who is returning shortly, will be instructed to have a frank talk with President Siad when he gets back and ask for his views on where he wants to go and what he expects from us if he disengages from the close Soviet relationship. We will also send an exploratory aid mission to Somalia to see what we might be able to do economically. [REDACTED]

(b)(1) [REDACTED] No conclusion was reached on the possibility of sending a U.S. vessel on a port call. The discussion highlighted some of the problems in rushing into too close a relationship with the Somalis too soon, including the possibility that Siad may be trying to play both us and the Soviets at the same time. More specific are the danger of frightening Kenya and of encouraging Somali territorial ambitions toward Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Kenya: We will offer economic aid for the Northeastern (i.e. Somali-inhabited) Province and talk further about military help. When Kenyatta dies, we will move quickly to show support for the government that succeeds him. It was pointed out that Kenya feels endangered these days not only by Somalia and the growing Soviet orientation of Ethiopia, but by Soviet aid to Tanzania and Uganda.

Djibouti: [REDACTED]

(b)(1) It was agreed that we would encourage the Saudis to help economically.

Sudan: We will move to make our relationship closer and warmer. If additional military equipment (beyond the recently approved C-130's) can be supplied, we will consider it. The possibility of stepping up naval visits to Port Sudan will be examined.

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The Committee agreed that a further review of the situation in the Horn will probably be needed in about six weeks in the light of further developments in Ethiopia, clearer information about what the Somali leadership is trying to do and better indications of how fast and far the Saudis are prepared to go. It was agreed that we should keep up discussions with other interested allies, such as the French and the Italians.

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